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CRAFTING INTERNAL HYBRIDS:  
COMPLEMENTARITIES, COMMON CHANGE INITIATIVES, AND 
THE TEAM-BASED ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Hybrid governance forms that seek to meld the virtues of both market control and 
traditional hierarchical control are alluring.  While extensive research has examined such 
hybrids forms, the research has been restricted largely to external hybrids ⎯ market 
exchanges infused with elements of hierarchical control.  Comparatively little research, 
outside of the M-form literature, has examined internal hybrids ⎯ hierarchical forms 
infused with elements of market control.  This paper contends that common change 
initiatives, such as TQM, reengineering, autonomous work teams, and group-based 
rewards, are appropriately viewed as attempts to craft internal hybrids by selectively 
infusing elements of market control within hierarchy. However, these common change 
initiatives are implemented commonly in isolation and, as a consequence, violate patterns 
of complementarity that both sustain traditional hierarchy or support the stable infusion 
of market control. Managers overlay new measures on existing, functionally-oriented 
structures; they implement new structures without new performance measures and 
without new pay systems; they implement new pay systems, but fail to restructure or 
develop new performance measures.  The paper argues that these violations of 
complementarity often trigger the unraveling of the bundle of elements that support 
traditional hierarchy and spiral hierarchies toward fundamental transformation.  The clear 
trajectory of these transformations is toward quite radically, disaggregated organizations 
structured around teams.  The paper presents both logic and evidence supporting the 
existence of complementarities among these common change initiatives.  
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CRAFTING INTERNAL HYBRIDS:  
COMPLEMENTARITIES, COMMON CHANGE INITIATIVES, AND 
THE TEAM-BASED ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 Traditional, bureaucratic hierarchies, characterized by narrowly structured tasks and 
behavior-based control, have been widely critiqued in the popular literature as slow, 
plodding structures that excessively diffuse responsibility for outputs, undermine quality, 
and provide weak performance incentives (Hammer and Champy, 1993, Juran, 1992; 
Quinn, 1992; Lawler, 1989; Daft and Lewin, 1993; Peters, 1986; 1992).  Trends in the 
1980’s and 1990’s toward outsourcing and deconglomeration represented in part 
responses to the deficiencies of traditional hierarchy.  Through boundary changes, 
managers substituted market control for hierarchical governance.  In the process, 
managers transformed poorly evaluated and poorly motivated activities with widely 
scattered responsibility into more easily measured and highly motivated activities 
governed by markets.   
 The lure of market control, as an alternative to hierarchy, stems from its contrasting 
governance properties; markets spontaneously prompt the formation, expansion, and 
dissolution of activities to meet rapidly changing market demand.  Markets provide high 
rates of flexibility and the capacity for autonomous adaptation (Williamson, 1991; 
Hayek, 1945).  However, replacing hierarchy with market control carries clear hazards 
and potential deficiencies (Williamson, 1985; 1991; Demsetz, 1988).  Unlike hierarchy, 
markets often provide inadequate safeguards to support cost-saving physical and human 
asset investments (Williamson, 1985; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978).  They often 
fail to support the level of co-specialization needed to generate valuable new knowledge 
or the application of existing knowledge (Grant, 1996; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; 
Arrow, 1974; Demsetz, 1988).  Unlike hierarchy, markets inadequately nurture the 
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affiliative bonds that support co-specialization and knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 1996; 
Kogut and Zander, 1996). Governance forms that optimally meld both market and 
hierarchical control are clearly quite alluring (Hennart, 1993; Zenger and Hesterly, 
1997).  
 While empirical and theoretical study of hybrid forms has been extensive in the 
organizations literature, research has almost exclusively focused on external hybrids ⎯ 
alliances, partnerships, and other forms of market contracting (Hennart, 1993; Powell, 
1987; 1990; Shane, 1996).  The study of internal hybrids ⎯  hierarchies infused with 
elements of markets ⎯ has been restricted largely to an examination of the multi-
divisional structure (Williamson, 1975) and associated transfer pricing issues 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1991). While the multi-divisional structure is a significant 
organizational innovation, its influence on the work routines, performance evaluation, 
and rewards of most employees is limited.  Rather, its effects are confined largely to 
senior management level within the hierarchy.   
 Attempts to craft internal hybrid structures may extend well beyond the multi-
divisional structure.  Many common organizational change initiatives are usefully viewed 
as focused attempts to infuse elements of market control within hierarchy.   These change 
initiatives seek to infuse the measurement precision of market control, the structural 
autonomy of market control, or the incentive intensity of market control.  I contend, 
however, that these isolated change initiatives violate patterns of complementarity that 
support traditional hierarchy as an organizational form. Managers overlay new measures 
on existing, functionally-oriented structures; they implement new structures without new 
performance measures and without new pay systems; they implement new pay systems, 
but fail to restructure or develop new performance measures.  Such violations of 
complementarity encourage further change initiatives which unravel the bundle of 
elements that support traditional hierarchy and pushes the organization toward a 
fundamental transformation.  The clear trajectory of this transformation is toward quite 
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radically, disaggregated organizations structured around teams. Complementary 
pressures, thus, push organizations toward either of two rather discrete and somewhat 
extreme organizational choices.  
 This paper examines complementarities among commonly-used change initiatives 
and the role of complementarities in producing internal hybrid governance forms ⎯ 
forms that infuse market control within hierarchy.  The first section of this paper 
develops basic propositions about the influence of complementaries on the choice of 
organizational forms.  A second section argues that traditional hierarchy and a newer, 
team-based organizational form are supported by discretely different bundles of 
complementary choices.  Common change initiatives, taken individually, are presented as 
attempts to selectively infuse market elements into traditional hierarchy ⎯ attempts that 
violate the complementary properties that support traditional hierarchy and team-based 
organizational forms.  A third section argues that the limited empirical evidence on 
change initiatives provides evidence consistent with the hypothesized complementary 
pressures. A final section discusses managerial implications.  
 
COMPLEMENTARITIES IN ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
 A broad range of literature suggests that organizational forms, which survive due to 
their efficiency or survival properties, are supported by sets of complementary elements 
(see Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Williamson, 1991; 
Miller and Friesenk 1984; Milgrom and Robert, 1990; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  
Implicit in much of this literature is an assumption that managers choose organizational 
forms, which offer improved efficiency and are therefore more likely to survive.  
Williamson (1991: 271) argues that viable organizational forms require “a syndrome of 
attributes that bear a supporting relation to one another” and contends that many forms of 
organization “never arise, or quickly die out, because they combine inconsistent 
features.”  Williamson focuses on the differing set of instruments, administrative 
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controls, incentives, and contracting regimes that accompany markets, hierarchy, and 
hybrid structures.  Using the modeling techniques of lattice theory, Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990) add precision to the study of organizational complementarities. They define 
complementarities to exist among the elements of an organizational form when 
increasing the level of one element increases the marginal return from increasing the 
level of all remaining elements.  Consequently, within a complementary organizational 
system, elements or decision variables “move up and down together in a systematic, 
coherent fashion... (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).”   Managers, therefore, cannot identify 
a single element from an alternative cluster of complements, i.e. an alternative 
organization form, graft it into the existing organization and expect enhanced results.  
They further conclude that radical changes to an element of a stable system may set in 
motion a process of decomposition in which the entire system effectively “unwinds” due 
to complementary pressures.  Once a system begins down a path of change that is 
supported by an underlying pattern of complementarity, this spiraling process of 
complementarity continues until environmental factors no longer support the pattern of 
complementarity (Milgrom, Qian, Roberts, 1991).   Empirical work generally confirms 
the presence of complementarities in human resource practices (Ichniowski, Shaw, and 
Prennushi, 1997; MacDuffie, 1995; Wruck and Jensen, 1994; Black and Lynch, 2001; 
Wood, 1999).   
 Much of the organizational theory literature similarly contends that organizational 
forms are discretely arrayed.  and The organizational configuration literature, for 
instance, argues that all combinations of structures, strategies, and cultures are not 
observed with equal frequency in organizational populations (Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings, 
1993).  Instead, a few specific configurations or clusters of traits define a large portion of 
these populations (Miller and Friesen, 1984).  Organizations, which closely resemble 
these commonly found configurations of traits, are more effective or higher performing 
(Doty, Glick, and Huber, 1993).  This literature also acknowledges fundamental non-
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linearities in the performance relationships among traits that comprise configurations.  
Consequently, organizations alternate between disequilibrium and equilibrium with these 
radical shifts occurring only occasionally.  Organizational forms are viewed as “pliable 
up to a point, but if stretched beyond that point, they actively resist change” (Meyer, 
Tsui, and Hinings, 1993).   The general focus of this approach is thus not on 
understanding the relationship among individual variables, but rather on understanding 
the patterns of organizational elements that exist within populations of organizational 
forms   
Several basic predictions emerge from this literature on complementarities.  First, 
significant change initiatives unleash complementary pressures to alter other 
organizational elements (or to retract an initial change initiative).  These complementary 
pressures reflect the possibility of performance gains from choosing complementary sets 
of change initiatives (or retracting non-complementary ones).  Second, succumbing to 
such complementary pressures unwinds existing organizational forms, initiating a process 
of change that ceases only when an alternative bundle of complementarities is discovered 
that pushes an organization toward a new form.  
 
COMPLEMENTARITIES IN TRADITIONAL AND MARKET-INFUSED 
HIERARCHIES  
Traditional Hierarchy  
 As Weber first discussed, traditional hierarchy represents a stable governance form, 
an “ideal type,” supported by a bundle of complementary attributes (Weber, 1946 tr.).   
Scott’s (1981: 69) interpretation of Weber is that each element of bureaucracy “operates 
not in isolation, but as part of a system of elements that, in combination, ... provide more 
effective and efficient administration.”  Scholars have described the underlying 
complementarity that supports traditional hierarchy in a variety of different ways.  These 
descriptions focus on bundles of elements including the structure, the promotion system, 
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the assignment of responsibilities, the incentive system, and the system of evaluation and 
measurement  (Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, 1997; Williamson, 1985 Weber, 1946 
tr.; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).   
 I argue in this paper that the key complementary elements supporting hierarchy 
involve choices around performance measurement, the structure of tasks, and the form of 
incentives.   Traditional hierarchy structures work into narrow functions that minimize 
employees’ interdependence and maximize the repetition of tasks.  This functional 
division of labor enables the development of expertise in performing tasks and permits 
the development of explicit rules and procedures to guide behavior (Scott, 1981).  
Measurement systems then complement this structure by monitoring employees’ 
adherence to rules, guidelines, and proscribed behaviors.  Incentives also complement 
this structure and measurement approach by being very low-powered; rewards are 
typically only weakly linked to functional task performance (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 
1988; Medoff and Abraham, 1980).  High-powered incentives that aggressively attach 
pay to functional task performance encourage an excessive functional focus and distract 
employees from attending to overall outputs of the firm.  Thus, the reward system 
reinforces the structure and the structure demands a particular measurement and incentive 
approach.  
   
Team-based Hierarchies  
 The distinctive bundle of complementary attributes termed hierarchy is ideally 
configured to govern the mass production of a stable set of goods or services.  Stability 
enables the formation of focused skill sets that benefit from a narrow division of labor 
and consequent specialization.  However, the deficiencies of traditional hierarchy emerge 
in environments demanding innovation and change.  The low powered incentives that 
accompany traditional hierarchy discourage the innovation and initiative necessary in 
these environments.  Narrowly defined tasks and measurement systems focused on rules, 
8 
guidelines, and proscribed behaviors also discourage the needed innovation and flexible 
response.  and A vast popular literature has discussed the emergence of  team-based 
organizational forms (e.g. Peters, 1986; 1992; Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman, 1995), 
involving extreme disaggregation and aggressive infusion of market control.  These 
team-based organizational forms are arguably better suited to environments demanding 
more rapid change and are supported by a fundamentally different set of choices along 
the dimensions of structure, measurement, and incentives.  These forms structure work 
cross-functionally into work teams, rather than functionally by task.  Each team is 
responsible for a complete output, process, or activity (Peters, 1992; Hammer and 
Champy, 1993; Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman, 1995).  Rather than measuring the 
inputs of individuals, these forms measure the output of teams.  Finally, rather than 
rewarding inputs quite weakly, these forms reward team outputs aggressively (Zenger 
and Marshall, 2000; Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2001).  
 Configured, measured, and rewarded in this manner, teams function under market-
like control, much like an external subcontractor.  Similar to an external contractor, the 
autonomous work teams possess the capacity to deliver complete outputs (often complete 
intermediate outputs) and are measured and rewarded based on delivery of these outputs.  
Again, there is a clear pattern of complementarity among the choices supporting team-
based organization.  Because teams are structured around the production of observable 
outputs, performance measurement is focused on team outputs.  Such clear output 
measures attached to teams also enable high-powered incentives.  High-powered 
incentives linked to team outputs in turn reinforce the team-based structure.  
 
Change Initiatives and Complementarities 
 While the team-based organization represents a stable hybrid governance form, few 
managers set out to implement the comprehensive bundle of changes that  transforms an 
organization from traditional hierarchy to team-based structures (see Figure 1).  Instead, 
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managers seek more modest infusions of market control.  They seek to remedy the 
deficiencies of hierarchy through common change initiatives that shift singular elements 
of traditional hierarchy toward the greater market control characteristic of team-based 
forms. Thus, many quality initiatives have sought to infuse market-like control through 
the infusion of output measurement.  A broad set of structural initiatives, led most 
recently by the reengineering movement, sought to infuse market control by restructuring 
around autonomous, cross-functional teams and subunits responsible for complete 
outputs.   A final set of change initiatives sought to infuse market control by creating 
high-powered incentives attached to output measures. 
 I contend that such limited changes violate the patterns of complementarity that 
support either traditional hierarchy or team-based organizations.  Such limited change 
initiatives, because they violate the complex pattern of complementarity among structure, 
measurement, and incentives, trigger complementary pressures to adjust other elements 
or cause a reversion to traditional hierarchy.  These complementary pressures are 
reflected in opportunities for performance gains from choosing complementary bundles. 
Those organizations that “succumb” to complementary pressures and implement a bundle 
of complementary changes will evolve into radically disaggregated team-based 
organizational forms.   
 Figure 1 displays the relationships introduced in this section and discussed through 
the remainder of the paper.  The drawing depicts traditional hierarchy and team-based 
forms as clusters of mutually complementary and unique choices around measurement, 
structure, and incentives. Traditional hierarchy is characterized by a functional structure 
that supports measures of individual inputs and necessitates low-powered incentives.  By 
contrast, team-based hierarchy is characterized by cross-functional team structures that 
support team output measures and facilitate higher-powered team rewards.  Common 
change initiatives target shifting singular design choices from those that support 
traditional hierarchy to those that support the team-based form.  For example, as 
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discussed below, quality initiatives have sought to shift the focus on measurement from 
individual to team outputs.  Analogous change initiatives have targeted shifts from 
functional structures to cross-functional teams and from low-powered to high-powered 
incentives.  These shifts trigger complementary pressures to alter other design choices or 
to reverse the initial change.  Of course, many change initiatives are more broadly 
focused than the caricatures presented below.  In part, greater breadth in these initiatives 
merely confirms the primary contention of complementarities presented in this paper.  
For purposes of illustration, the discussion highlights only the primary focus of these 
change initiatives. 
 
 
CHANGE INITIATIVES AS MARKET INFUSION: EVIDENCE OF 
COMPLEMENTARITIES  
Measurement Initiatives as Market Infusion  
The Total Quality Movement.  In traditional bureaucratic organizations, the division of 
tasks into narrow functions ensures that outputs are observable only for very large 
aggregations of individuals.  Entire divisions are responsible for outputs and are 
measured through financial reporting.  Relevant measurement systems for employees are 
therefore focused on assessing employee behaviors in performing narrow tasks.  This 
structure and measurement system, however “[insulates employees] from intimate 
knowledge of customer needs” (Juran, 1992: 388).  Instead, employees’ efforts are 
guided through “specifications, standards, and procedures” (Juran, 1992: 388).   The 
primary contention of the quality movement has been that traditional hierarchy 
encouraged a disregard for the ultimate customer, including a neglect of behaviors that 
would enhance quality (Wruck and Jensen, 1994).    
 It is this disregard for the quality of outputs that the quality movement seeks to 
remedy.  This remedy arrives primarily through a set of measures to meter and motivate 
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attention to these neglected performance outcomes (Hackman and Wageman, 1995; 
Sashkin and Kiser, 1993).  These measures seek to shift employee attention away from 
satisfying managers and toward satisfying customers, whether internal or external to the 
firm (Dean and Bowen, 1994).  Thus, total quality programs (TQM) identify customers 
(either internal or external), identify their performance requirements, and define metrics, 
which assess performance in satisfying their requirements (Ishikawa, 1985: 43; Deming, 
1986: 177-182; Sitkin, Sutcliffe, Schroeder, 1994).  New measures encourage employees 
to focus on more precise indications of organizational output — the quantity, quality, 
timeliness, and accompanying service associated with the goods and services they 
produce and sell.  Such output-focused measurement is, of course, a characteristic feature 
of market control.  Markets encourage employees to focus on outputs, because outputs 
are rewarded through the payment of prices.  
 The benchmarking movement and Baldrige Award Program accelerated the infusion 
of this element of market control during the early 1990’s.  For many firms, the Baldrige 
Award criteria functioned as a blueprint for modifying measurement systems (Garvin, 
1991; Baldrige Award Criteria, 1994).  These criteria demanded that firms benchmark 
their performance and processes and create metrics that permitted performance 
comparison across firms, like international standards such as ISO (Eccles, 1991; Maskell, 
1991; Garvin, 1991).  Furthermore, these guidelines demanded active measurement of 
customer satisfaction with outputs.  The net effect of these efforts to improve 
measurement was that firms developed an expanded internal capacity, similar to that 
accessed through market control, to focus employee attention on key measures that drive 
customers’ satisfaction.   Osterman (2000) estimates that by 1997 57% of establishments 
had implemented TQM with at least 50% of their employees.  
 
Complementarities and Quality Initiatives.  According to the complementarity logic, this 
fundamental shift from individual input to group output measurements should provoke 
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complementary pressures for further change (see Figure 1).  Oddly enough, leaders of the 
quality movement rather clearly denounced any such complementary changes (Deming, 
1993; Juran, 1974; Ishikawa, 1985). Initially, quality initiatives typically sought to work 
within the existing hierarchical structure (Lawler, 1994:70; Hackman and Wageman, 
1995).  To redesign or restructure work cross-functionally around outputs was viewed as 
an activity beyond the bounds of TQM (Graham, 1993; Hackman and Wageman, 1995).  
Similarly, TQM philosophy generally regarded incentive pay, based on either individual 
or team performance, as destructive to the objectives of the quality movement (Deming, 
1993; Juran, 1974; Ishikawa, 1985; Hackman and Wageman, 1995: 336).  Pay for 
performance was viewed as undermining intrinsic motivation, encouraging employees to 
focus only on those few elements of performance that are measured (Ishikawa, 1985; 
Deming, 1986).  Thus, total quality initiatives are change initiatives that in many 
circumstances set out to explicitly avoid altering two of the three elements that support 
functionally structured hierarchy.   
 Consistent with the core proposition that complementarities govern the effectiveness 
or stability of change initiatives, pressures to make complementary adjustments should be 
considerable despite this limited focus of quality initiatives.  The significant changes in 
measurement associated with TQM should undermine both the existing structure and the 
existing incentive scheme and pressure complementary changes.  Measuring cross-
functional outputs heightens interest in cross-functional coordination, thereby 
undermining the existing functional structure.  Similarly, these new output measures 
lessen the risk imposed on employees by higher-powered incentives  (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992; Lal and Srinivasan, 1993).    
 Recent reviews of the quality movement provide evidence that managers feel these 
complementary pressures quite acutely.  Many studies suggest that performance gains for 
many firms were modest (Fuchsberg, 1992; Rheger, et al., 1994).  For instance, surveys 
by A.T. Kearney and Arthur D. Little both suggest that as few as one third of the 
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companies with total quality programs perceived significant performance results 
(Schaffer, 1992; Kendrick, 1992). Black and Lynch (2001) conclude that TQM 
implemented in isolation has no positive effect on performance and that positive effects 
from TQM require the implementation of practices that give employees greater voice.  
Certainly, team-based structures which grant employees control over outputs would 
qualify for such a practice.  Consistent with the complementarities logic, Hackman and 
Wageman (1995) credit the common failure of TQM to attempts at “fundamental change 
without changing the fundamentals (p. 336).”    
 Surveys of corporate quality initiatives suggest that TQM’s scope broadened 
significantly with time.  In particular, TQM initiatives embraced changes in reward 
structures.  A 1991 Conference Board study suggested that 85% of organizations with 
TQM programs supplemented these with new incentive initiatives (Conference Board, 
1991).  Further, the tendency to modify incentives appears to have escalated with time 
(KPMG Peat Marwick, 1991).  Hackman and Wageman (1995) conclude that, while only 
a small percentage of firms initially implement incentives in conjunction with a quality 
program, the majority of firms with five or more years of TQM experience explicitly 
rewarded the achievement of quality goals.  They concluded that the absence of 
incentives in TQM was simply “unstable over the longer term”  (Hackman and 
Wageman, 1995: 336).   As firms modify pay systems to complement TQM, they 
typically attach pay to teams, groups, or the organization, rather than individual 
performance (KPMG Peat Marwick, 1991).    
 Quality initiatives also increasingly adopted complementary structural changes ⎯ 
changes in the design of work and autonomy of groups.  The 1991 KPMG Peat Marwick 
survey found that while only 15% of all organizations with TQM initiatives had 
restructured work around self-directed work teams, 60% of those with more than five 
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years of experience had restructured around self-directed work teams.  Such teams 
typically include all functionality required to deliver an observable and easily measured 
output and thereby complement efforts to enhance measurement accuracy.  Osterman 
(2000) similarly reports that the simultaneous implementation of TQM, self-managed 
teams, and job rotation (a device likely to be found in cross-functional teams) increased 
substantially from 1992 to 1997.   
 In summary, consistent with the hypothesized effects, complementary pressures 
appear pervasive in implementing TQM initiatives. Despite formal rhetoric that 
discourages structural changes and strongly opposes incentives, the majority of firms 
appear to eventually make complementary changes in structure and incentives.  Further, 
the probability of such complementary changes escalates with time.  
 
Structural Initiatives as Market Infusion 
Cross-functional Teams.    The functional configuration of traditional hierarchy typically 
leaves employees rather weakly empowered to influence outputs sold to the market, even 
if outputs are measured.  Responsibility for key performance attributes, such as product 
or service quality, speed of delivery, or speed of order processing, are widely diffused.  
This diffusion of responsibility ensures that employee attention to customer concerns and 
outputs is generally quite weak.  Markets can influence employee behaviors only when 
employees can influence products sold to the market.  Hence, a second set of common 
change initiatives seeks to restructure work by combining within small teams the critical 
functions necessary to generate complete outputs (see Figure 1).   
 Surveys of human resource practices in the late 1980’s estimated that perhaps as 
many one fourth of large US corporations had experimented with restructuring work into 
such cross-functional or self-directed teams (Verespej, 1990; O'Dell and McAdams, 
1987; Lawler, 1986). These cross-functional teams receive extensive latitude in choosing 
the means whereby outputs are achieved.  Teams assign tasks, manage quality control, 
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perform discipline, evaluate and select team members, and manage production schedules.  
With such clear responsibility for outputs, internal teams function with a degree of 
autonomy characteristic of market control.   
 By the early 1990’s, the use of self-directed teams had become considerably more 
widespread, encompassing a large portion of the workforce (Gordon, 1992; Mehta, 1994; 
Verespej, 1990).  Osterman’s study (1994) of large firms reported that the majority of 
employees were assigned to self-directed work teams in 40% of the business units 
examined. The reengineering wave of the 1990’s fueled the diffusion of cross-functional 
teams with its mandate to configure work around  “groups of tasks that together create a 
result of value to customers” (Hammer, 1996:11; see also, Hammer and Champy, 1993; 
Hammer, 1996). 
 
Complementarities and Cross-functional teams.    In the same way that measurement 
initiatives in the quality movement ignored structure and incentives, structural initiatives 
around teams have typically neglected complementary measurement and incentive 
changes.  Reengineering’s original proponents subsequently criticized reengineering 
initiatives for their narrow focus on the configuration or structure of work (White, 1996; 
Hammer, 1996; Champy 1995).  Meyer (1994) also argues that organizations often retain 
traditional, functionally-oriented performance measures in implementing cross-functional 
teams.  Such functionally-oriented measurement works in opposition to cross-functional 
structure by encouraging team participants to pursue functional interests.  Incentive 
changes have also typically been outside the domain of structural initiatives around 
teams.  Mohrman, Cohen and Mohrman’s study (1995) of firms structured around teams 
found that most still used merit pay as the primary mechanism for rewarding employees.  
Such pay systems rather weakly reward individual performance and individual behavior.  
Similarly, a 1994 Hay/Conference Board survey (Gross, 1995:15) found that among 
those corporations, which had undertaken reengineering, only 25% revised pay systems.  
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Thus, the majority of firms implement team structure with pay systems in place that 
undermine cross-functional teams.  
 The prediction is that over time firms adopt changes in measurement and incentives 
that complement these new structures.  Gross (1995:15) reports that while only 25% of 
firms in a Hay/Conference Board study revised their pay system in conjunction with an 
initial reengineering initiative, the vast majority of firms indicated strong pressures to 
subsequently revamp their pay systems.  Gross comments that eventually the new work 
culture, now structured around group outputs, and the old reward system, which rewards 
individual inputs, “makes for an unstable situation” (Gross, 1995: 15).    Similar 
complementary pressures encourage firms to adopt group-based performance measures to 
support new group-based structures. Indeed, reengineering initiatives often measured 
team outputs (Champy, 1995).  Further, the trajectory of measurement and benchmarking 
initiatives has been clearly toward measuring the performance of teams (Meyer, 1994; 
Eccles, 1991; Maskell, 1991), which in turn has been enabled by the cross-functional 
clustering of tasks.  Thus, much like measurement initiatives, structural initiatives appear 
to confront strong pressures to adopt complementary pay and measurements schemes.  
 
Incentive Initiatives as Market Infusion 
Group-based Rewards.  Traditional, functionally-structured hierarchies offer rather low-
powered incentives.  Pay levels within traditional hierarchies are largely based on 
seniority; changes in individual contributions yield rather insignificant gains in individual 
pay (Medoff and Abraham, 1980; Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988).  A final set of 
change initiatives focuses on replacing the traditional, low-powered pay systems of 
hierarchy with higher-powered incentives, typically group-based rewards (see Figure 1).  
Much like market control, such reward systems compensate group members for 
delivering measurable outputs.  These outputs may either be final outputs to be marketed 
and sold or intermediate outputs transferred to internal customers. 
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 Like cross-functional teams and TQM, group-based pay plans have became 
widespread in the 1990’s (Hewitt Associates, 1994; O'Dell and McAdams, 1987; 
Schuster and Zingheim, 1992; McAdams and Hawk, 1992; Mitchell, Lewin and Lawler, 
1990).  Studies of prevalence suggest that by the early 1990’s as many as 25% of private 
sector firms had experimented with such reward plans (Hewitt Associates, 1993; O'Dell 
and McAdams, 1987).  The vast majority of these incentive schemes were, however, 
profit sharing or gainsharing pay plans that measured and rewarded the performance of 
very large groups within the firm (McAdams and Hawk, 1992).2  For all but the most 
senior managers, attaching pay to such aggregated measures of performance is of little 
incentive value.  To place large portions of individual pay contingent on the performance 
of large groups simply imposes large amounts of uncertainty on individual employees, 
while providing little motivation.   
 
Complementarities and Group-based Rewards.  Theoretical literature in agency theory 
suggests that the capacity to implement high-powered incentives is determined by the 
accuracy of performance measures and employees’ capacity to control them (Basu, et. al, 
1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  Uncertainty is reduced as the link between pay and 
measured performance increases. Similarly, attaching pay to measures that employees 
can easily control reduces further the level of uncertainty.  This reduced uncertainty 
escalates the intensity with which pay can be effectively linked to performance.  
 Group size is clearly a primary determinant of individuals’ control over group 
performance. Firms are more willing to attach a large portion of pay to group 
performance when groups are 10 individuals than when groups are composed of 10,000 
individuals.  When groups are large, the free-riding problem is substantial and the 
incentive value of high-powered  group-based rewards is modest. Therefore, structural 
                     
2 In 1992, McAdams and Hawk estimated that only 5-7% of group incentive plans were linked to 
performance measures at the team level. 
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initiatives that craft small teams responsible for clear outputs enable high-powered 
incentives.  Consistent with this prediction, Zenger and Marshall (2000) find that 
incentive intensity in group rewards indeed rises with diminishing group size and 
enhanced measurement accuracy.  Hence, efforts to create small groups with easily 
measured outputs enhances the capacity of the firm to infuse high-powered group 
incentives.  
 Measurement initiatives of TQM may also enable the infusion of high-powered group 
incentives.  Measurement initiatives enhance the accuracy of performance measures to 
which pay is attached.  To aggressively reward traditional indicators of functional inputs 
rather than cross-functional outputs is likely to trigger inattention to key drivers of output 
performance.   High-powered incentives require output measures controllable by small 
groups of employees.  Thus, consistent with the complementarities logic, crafting new, 
high-powered group incentives appears increasingly linked to structural initiatives around 
teams and measurement initiatives.  
 There has been little systematic study of the recent evolution of group incentive 
plans.  Nonetheless, few would dispute that the trajectory in group rewards has been 
toward rewards attached to smaller groups.  During the past decade group incentive plans 
have  migrated from profit sharing plans toward gainsharing plans and from gainsharing 
plans toward team-based pay plans. Complementary initiatives that structurally create 
and measure small, autonomous groups clearly enable this infusion of team-based 
rewards. 
 
SPIRALING TOWARD A MODULAR, TEAM-BASED ORGANIZATION? 
 The preceding discussion suggests that complementary pressures render problematic 
the attempt of common change initiatives to selectively infuse elements of market 
control.  The source of these complementary pressures is both structural and behavior-
based.  Thus, structurally, those implementing measurement initiatives such as TQM 
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soon discover that attention to new measures benefits from complementary incentives 
and that the capacity to find accurate new measures is increased by restructuring work. 
Similarly, those implementing reengineering programs around teams soon discover that 
newly structured teams deliver a host of new performance measures, which in turn 
facilitate higher-powered group incentives.  Finally, managers who lead with high-
powered incentives quickly discover that infusing high-powered incentives requires new 
performance measures; new performance measures are in turn enabled by new team-
based structures.  These structural pressures to adopt complementary change initiatives 
are also reinforced by employee behaviors and incentives.  For instance, employees 
assigned to highly autonomous, cross-functional teams will desire to have their incentives 
attached to the outputs of this team.  Thus, consistent with the complementarities 
literature, significant changes to a core element of hierarchy unleash complementary 
pressures to either alter other elements or to abandon the original change.  Isolated 
change initiatives often reach trigger points that prompt further complementary changes  
⎯ changes that may, as in the case of TQM, even violate the fundamental philosophy of 
the proponents of the change. 
 In the wake of common change initiatives, therefore, complementarities pressure the 
organization toward broader change which both unravels hierarchy and spirals the 
organization toward an alternative, team-based configuration with its own pattern of 
complementarity.  Indeed, such new forms are the logical extension of a  complementary 
bundle of common change initiatives around structure, measurement, and rewards (see 
Figure 1).  In this configuration, structure, incentives, and measurement are all focused 
around small, autonomous modules within the hierarchy that are responsible for clear 
outputs.  Such configurations are analogous to the multi-divisional (M-form) structure, 
but implemented at a much lower organizational level. Rather than the functional task 
structure of traditional hierarchy, team-based organizations cross-functionally cluster 
tasks around small, autonomous teams responsible for definable outputs.  Rather than the 
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weak individual incentives of traditional hierarchy, team-based organizations adopt 
higher-powered group incentives.  Rather than measurement focused on behaviors, this 
configuration focuses on group output measurement.  Configured as such, individual 
units within the firm closely resemble small, autonomous firms.  Consequently, 
organizations composed of configurations of these teams closely resemble an internal 
market in which semi-autonomous teams are operated, evaluated, and rewarded in a 
manner similar to external subcontractors.  Thus, as complementary change initiatives in 
measurement, structure, and rewards unravel hierarchies, market control emerges.  
    
Discrete Choices and Pressures to Resist Complementarities 
 One of the implications of the complementarity logic is that these internal hybrid 
governance forms, much like markets and hierarchies, are discrete governance choices.  
Team-based organizations, like traditional markets and hierarchies, are supported by a 
unique bundle of complementary features. Managers are constrained in their capacity to 
craft forms that violate these complementary bundles.   Nonetheless, managers have clear 
incentives to attempt violations of complementarities.  The motivation stems from a 
simple desire to craft forms with governance attributes that lie intermediate to the market 
control of team-based structures and the hierarchical control of traditional hierarchy.  
 The discreteness of governance forms described in this paper is thus a likely source of 
managerial frustration.  For instance, suppose task conditions demand an organizational 
form with attributes positioned somewhere between a functionally-structured hierarchy 
and a radically disaggregated team-based structure. A firm that begins with a 
functionally-structured hierarchy may implement a change program such as TQM, 
reengineering, or group incentives, in search of an organizational form positioned 
between these discrete choices.  Complementary pressures may render any such 
intermediate configuration quite unstable and perhaps low performing.  If the firm adopts 
complementary changes, this may infuse a level of market control that is excessive for 
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the task conditions and environmental demands  Thus, upon achieving this state, the 
deficiencies of market governance become evident.  Consequently, the firm may choose 
to recentralize the structure, weaken incentives, and alter measurement away from teams.  
However, doing so places the organization on a pathway of complementarities back 
toward functionally-structured hierarchy.  Assuming governance properties follow 
organizational choices with some lag, the rational solution may be for an organization to 
vacillate between these discrete governance choices, i.e. internal hybrid structure and 
functional structure.  Such vacillation avoids violating complementarities and maximizes 
the time during which the organization is in an optimal intermediate state (Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2001).  
 It is the above logic that rescues the arguments of this paper from the seeming 
empirical inconsistency that we observe rather few radically disaggregated, team-based 
organizational forms.  In part this is because firms may spend some considerable period 
of time transitioning toward or away from team-based structures.  Furthermore, as 
indicated previously, managers may choose to actively resist the pattern of 
complementarities that govern traditional hierarchy and team-based structures.  The 
critical point is that, while complementary pressures push organizations toward stable 
endpoints, managerial intervention is required to maintain more intermediate, though less 
stable, configurations.   
 
Leadership and Complementarities  
 An image of managers pressured by complementarities to adopt specific 
organizational changes is seemingly incongruous with the image of managers as 
architects of organizational form.  This paper suggests that managers, indeed, have 
somewhat constrained flexibility in crafting internal hybrid governance forms that infuse 
elements of markets.  However, discussions of complementarities in both economics and 
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organization theory focus on the significance of leadership in crafting stable 
organizational forms (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).  Such 
leadership requires at a minimum cognizance of the patterns of complementarity that 
support organizational forms and influence common change initiatives.  Further, change 
initiatives that coordinate adjustments in measurement, structure, and reward system may 
outperform change initiatives that lack coordination.   The absence of coordination 
among change initiatives may well lead to results in which limited change initiatives 
rationally taken to incrementally respond to environmental changes may actually damage 
performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).  New compensation plans that fail to develop 
complementary measurement systems may escalate turnover and trigger low 
performance. Similarly, structural initiatives that maintain existing compensation and 
measurement systems may find that these new structures also undermine performance.   
 One of the difficulties in attending to complementarities is that different change 
initiatives are often crafted by different groups of employees and managers.  
Compensation initiatives may stem from human resource departments, reengineering 
from line management, and quality initiatives from a separate quality function.  The 
separation of these decisions increases the probability that non-complementary design 
choices will be selected.  However, as Milgrom and Roberts (1995) have noted, the role 
of the leader need not be to define the outcome, i.e. define the new organizational form, 
but rather to effectively convey the pattern of complementarity that governs 
organizational forms. Managers need not mandate a comprehensive shift from traditional 
bureaucratic organizations to team-based structures.  Rather, leaders must convey the 
logic of complementarity that exists within an organizational form and among common 
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change initiatives.  Complementary pressures will themselves reveal desired refinements.  
Group rewards are improved through improved output measurement and improved output 
measurement results from the formation of small, cross-functional groups.   New cross-
functional groups are aided by supportive group rewards and measures.  Managers must 
generate the surrounding intuition that triggers optimal choices.  Such information 
provides a “direction for coordinated search” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995: 190).  
Leadership or central coordination may therefore dramatically quicken and enhance the 
probability of transforming traditional hierarchies into internal hybrid organizational 
forms infused with significant market control.  
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